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Comparative studies of transition processes in China and Central and Eastern
Europe have so far focussed mainly on the striking differences in macro-
economic performances between the two regions (Table 1). Arguably such a
comparison has only limited policy implications, as counterfactual analyses that
would prove the overall superiority of one reform strategy over another (e.g.
Naughton, 1993; Jefferson and Rawski, 1992; 1994) must be conducted in
abstraction from diverging initial conditions and exogenous factors (Sachs and
Woo, 1994; Raiser, 1994b). Nevertheless, some areas of policy interest in
transition economies lend themselves readily to a comparative analysis that is
less subject to the variability of factors outside direct policy control. This paper
is motivated by the attempt to focus on one such area, namely the reform of state
owned enterprises (SOEs) in the industrial sector, and establish a link to macro-
economic performance indicators in formerly centrally planned economies
(FCPEs). The strength of this link will crucially depend on the size of the
industrial sector in the economy and on the share of industrial output produced
by SOEs. Nonetheless, if the causality can be established, policy conclusions
with respect to SOE reforms will have macro-economic repercussions at least in
relative terms. The advantage is that the conclusions are specific in contrast to
the generality of arguments in favour of "gradual or shock therapies".
Industrial SOEs arguably were the core of the socialist development strategy
pursued in all FCPEs. These strategies may have differed in the scale, the
coverage and the duration of the planning mechanism. Nonetheless, the effects
of distorted relative prices, the absence of profit incentives and the lack of
competitive pressures on SOEs left all FCPEs with the daunting task to reform
the behaviour of the very core of their economies if a sustained improvement of
economic performance was to be achieved. The central argument of this paper is
that the continuing subsidisation of inefficient and loss-making enterprises has
caused and continues to cause macro-economic imbalances in tfie course of
transition both in the European FCPEs and in China. Because it is SOEs that are
most likely to be subjected to a soft budget constraint, the real challenge in all
transition economies lies with industrial reforms and the effect they have on the
behaviour of agents in the public sector.
This paper is part of a research project on the role of state-owned enterprise reform in the
transition process comparing the experiences of China and Central Eastern Europe.
Financial support form the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Martin
Raiser would like to thank Peter Nunnenkamp for patient reading of earlier drafts and































































































































a Data for China are from SSB (1992), Harold and Lall (1993) for 1992 figures and IFS (1993) for
the CPI data. Loans to the Central Government is included under revenues, which biases the fiscal
deficit downwards. Investment shares refer to "Accumulation" in SSB (1992). — b Data are from
PlanEcon (1993), except for fiscal balance and investment for Czechoslovakia as a whole from IFS
(1993). Exports excluding shipments to Slovakia increased 20 per cent in 1991-93. —
 c The first
row encompasses the period after the New Economic Mechanism introduced in 1968. GDP data are
net material product from Marer et al. (1992). Date in the second row are from PlanEcon (1993). —
d The first row includes the period of partial liberalisation since 1982 (see Gomulka, 1986). Data are
from Marer et al. (1992). Fiscal data from IFS (1993). Note that 1982 is a trough year which biases
performance upwards. Data in the second row are from PlanEcon (1993). Export performance,is
overstated by the exclusion of CMEA trade. —
 e Data for the USSR begin with Gorbatchev's ascent
to power in 1985. No figures for 1990-91 were available in Marer et al. (1992). — f Data from
PlanEcon (1994). Employment data are highly unreliable for Russia, official unemployment
currently stands at 2 per cent of the labour force. Exports exclude inter-republican trade within the
former Soviet Union.
The second section of this paper draws on Janos Kornai's (1980; 1986) analysis
of socialist economies to develop a number of hypotheses concerning the macro-
economic consequences of soft budget constraints for SOEs in transition
economies (see also Kornai, 1993; Raiser, 1993). It also analyses some of the
sources of budget softness and derives a set of indicators for the existence of the
phenomenon. The third section presents an overview over the experience with
hardening budget constraints in three European FCPEs and relates theirachievements to diverging macro-economic factors. The fourth section rums to
an analysis of enterprise reforms in China and assesses the extent to which
budget hardening has taken place to date. Some quantification of total subsidies
to Chinese industry is attempted and its macro-economic consequences are
evaluated. The fifth section uses survey data for 300 Chinese enterprises to de-
tect behavioural patterns of SOEs between 1980 and 1992. The sixth section
concludes.
II. SOURCES, CONSEQUENCES AND MEASUREMENT OF SOFT
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
1. Sources of Soft Budget Constraints
The concept of a soft budget constraint was introduced by Kornai (1980; 1986)
to explain the behavioural differences between a capitalist firm and a production
unit in a centrally planned economy (CPE). A capitalist firm that fails to cover
its costs out of current revenues (or, in the case of borrowing from outside
sources, out of expected future income) ultimately is forced to exit the market. In
a CPE such an exit-threat is non existent. As long as a firm has access to implicit
or explicit subsidies from the government there are no incentives even to cover
the costs of production, let alone behave as a cost minimiser.
The subsidisation of loss-makers in CPEs can take a variety of forms. Kornai
(1986) has highlighted four major areas. First, SOEs subject to mandatory
planning can negotiate input and output prices and quotas. In the context of the
Chinese economic reforms this aspect may have been (and in a few industries
may continue to be) crucial, as the two-tier pricing system offers large profit
margins to those SOEs able to obtain most of their inputs at below market prices
and sell part of their output at free market prices (e.g. Hussain, 1990).
1
Second, explicit subsidies from governmental budgetary funds may help to
finance cost overruns in order to maintain the level of material production.
Third, firms may enter into political negotiations about the level of effective
taxation, lobbying for tax exemptions and reductions in tax rates. Again in
China, the contract responsibility system offers ample opportunities for selective
tax waivers and discretionary taxation. Fourth, as the banking system takes on a
larger role in the financing of investment, soft loans become a way of keeping
loss-making SOEs afloat.
2 A major aim of economic reforms in all transition
1 As discussed in Section IV, by the early 1990s, the extent of price liberalisation had
probably eliminated most implicit price subsidies to SOEs.
2 The Yugoslav economic reforms are a case in point, as decentralisation made the banking
system pivotal in the allocation of resources. Consequently bank credit at negative realeconomies is to reduce subsidies to SOEs, but all four aspects of budget softness
are still relevant to FCPEs to a varying extent.
The causes of soft budget constraints for enterprises in CPEs and FCPEs may be
analysed at three different levels (Nagaoka and Atiyas, 1990). The first level
concerns the incentives for the government to keep loss-making enterprises
afloat. Some compensation for losses inflicted by price controls and mandatory
output requirements may be judged necessary not merely on the grounds of
fairness but also to keep the economy functioning. In the presence of market
imperfections or distortions the social value of an enterprise may be higher than
its market value determined by the price of its output. Moreover, as long as
enterprises shoulder most of the social welfare functions and an independent
social security system is not in operation, the social costs of regionally
concentrated large scale unemployment may outweigh the net present value of
subsidies to the government (Hardy, 1992). Finally, competition by bureaucrats
in a rent-seeking environment may lead government officials to extend subsidies
to their constituency, regardless of the overall negative welfare effects
(Aizenmann, 1991). The competition between provincial governments in China
would be a case in point (Herrrnann-PiUath, 1991).
The second level at which the causes of budget softness may be analysed is the
financial system. In most CPEs, state-owned banks became more and more
important in the allocation of resources (for China see Bowles and White; 1992).
Even after the introduction of a two-tier banking system (1984 in China, 1987 in
Hungary and 1988 in Poland) these banks often continued to be run as monetary
counterparts to the SOEs in the productive sector. Their objective was not the
maximisation of the asset value in their portfolio, as there was no option for
take-overs or trading in assets. Indeed, as bankruptcy laws in CPEs were
typically non-existent or remained unenforced, banks merely cared about
continuing interest payments by debtors rather than about their underlying
performance. Changing the behaviour of state-owned banks in FCPEs in turn
encounters severe problems that derive from the legacy of underdeveloped
financial markets (Estrin, Hare and Suranyi, 1992a; Buch et al., 1994).
Experience and human capital in commercial banking is low, state-owned banks
themselves are under little corporate control and the shift of monetary
management to indirect control instruments may suffer from credibility defects
(Bofinger, 1992; Winiecki, 1993). As a result, commercial banks in FCPEs often
rates of interest became the largest component of subsidisation of Yugoslav SOEs (Kraft
and Vodopivec, 1992).resort to distress lending to loss-making customers and hope for a government
bail-out (e.g. Begg and Portes, 1992; Schmieding and Buch, 1992).
The third set of causes for soft budget constraints are found at the level of the
enterprise itself. The lack of private property rights reduces the incentives for
firm managers to invest in the long-run value of the firm. In CPEs the objective
to fulfil the mandatory requirements imposed on an enterprise by the planning
authorities mostly superseded profit considerations by SOE managers (Brada,
1992). In FCPEs the lack of corporate control and the insecurity of property
rights combines to encourage collusion by workers and managers, leading to
excessive leverage and the gradual decapitalisation of the firm through wage and
interest payments (Schmieding, 1993).
3 Linking managerial compensations and
worker remuneration to performance can help to mitigate some of these
incentive problems (e.g. Groves et al., 1993). However, the question of concern
for an effective hardening of budget constraints is what to do with loss-making
enterprises. A strict bankruptcy rule for all enterprises in payment arrears may
fail to provide incentives for cost-minimisation if the cause of bad financial
performance is an inherited stock problem (Brada, 1992). Recapitalisation, on
the other hand, carries a high moral hazard risk. Ultimately, the state as owner of
the firm and as holder of most of its debt through the public banking system is
responsible for enforcing bankruptcy rules. However, the state's role as a
creditor typically conflicts with its other social objectives. An interesting
manifestation of budget softness at the level of the firm is the dramatic rise in
inter-enterprise indebtedness during periods of monetary restraint in FCPEs
(Komai, 1993).
4 In China it is estimated that to clear the so-called "triangular
debts" one Yuan of fresh money per three Yuan of outstanding debt would be
required.
5
2. Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints <
The problems discussed in the previous sub-section are not restricted to socialist
economies in transition. Price distortions, financial market imperfections and the
3 See the articles by Tybout et al. (in Corbo and de Melo, 1985) for an analysis of corporate
control and enterprise financial performance in the Southern Cone of Latin America.
4 It should be noted that this partly results from the undercapitalisation of SOEs in FCPEs
making them particularly vulnerable to a reduction in working capital credits from the
banking system (Calvo and Coricelli, 1992). However, the cases of Romania and Russia
demonstrate that while inter-enterprise credits tend to increase when credit growth is
reduced they also stay on that level once monetary policy is relaxed again (Balcerowicz
and Gelb, 1994)
5 By personal communication of Dr. Fan Gang (1993), Institute of Economics, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences.subsidisation of inefficient public sectors have also characterised a large number
of developing countries (and to a lesser extent industrialised countries as well),
with serious macro-economic consequences (Raiser, 1994a). The macro-
economic spill-overs of soft budget constraints for enterprises are twofold (see
Hofman and Koop, 1990). First, while profitable firms may react quickly to
incentives for profit maximisation, losses continue to be socialised in economies
with soft budget constraints. As a result governments in FCPEs, as well as many
developing countries tend to progressively loose control over resource
mobilisation in profitable sectors, while at the same time the lack of an exit-
threat leads to an increasing absorption of subsidies by loss-makers. To the
extent that this process is accommodated by the monetary authorities, economies
that fail to harden budget constraints of domestic producers may encounter
increasing inflationary pressures. This hypothesis has found substantial
empirical support in the hyperinflationary episodes in Poland, Yugoslavia and
more recently Russia.
6
Second, as resources are bound in unprofitable firms, inputs are drawn away
from potentially profitable activities. This problem is the more serious the bigger
the weight of the inefficient sector in the economy and the smaller the pool of
available savings and natural and labour resources (Sachs and Woo, 1994). Soft
budget constraints for a large share of the enterprise sector thus tend to put the
economy on an extensive growth path that quickly runs into supply bottlenecks.
Latent pressures for overheating either provoke recurrent macro-economic
boom-and-bust cycles or, once the extensive growth path is exhausted, lead into
endemic shortages and stagnation. It follows that the structural adjustment that
should follow liberalisation and increasing market orientation in FCPEs and
developing countries will be achieved quicker if budget constraints are
effectively hardened early on in the reform process (Raiser, 1994a).
3. Measuring the Soft Budget Constraint
The discussion in sub-section II. 1 pointed out several sources of implicit and
explicit subsidies for SOEs. This sub-section presents a set of empirical
indicators for the phenomenon. These indicators also from the basis of the
empirical work in Sections III through V.
Raiser (1994a) extends this argument by focussing on the behavioural inertia that may
result from extended periods of budget softness. Using seven macro-economic indicators
of budget softness in a cross-sectional analysis of 33 developing countries, soft budget
contraints are found to have significant inflationary and growth reducing effects. Thereby
budget softness serves as a proxy for inflationary expectations in a standard monetary
inflation model.a) Pricing policy: particular sectors may benefit from preferential input pricing in
FCPEs pursuing gradual price reform. For China a comparison of sectoral
material input and output deflators may help to gauge the extent of implicit
protection through price controls. This may then be compared with calculations
of effective protection rates at a sectoral level published by the World Bank
(1994). In European FCPEs the development of energy prices, for instance, is a
crucial indicator of remaining input protection to the manufacturing sector (Hare
and Hughes, 1992).
b) Trade and competition policy: unproductive enterprises may be protected
from domestic and foreign competition by entry barriers (as in the Chinese case
by restrictions on inter-regional factor and goods mobility) and tariff walls or
high non-tariff barriers (NTBs). A proposed rough proxy for the overall degree
of trade protection are import penetration ratios on a sectoral level (Raiser,
1994a).
7
c) Tax policy: direct tax subsidies may be measured directly as a share of
government expenditure to GDP. Additionally, data on tax waivers may be
collected and the share of revenue lost due to preferential tax policies can be
quantified for some countries. At the micro-economic level, discretionary
taxation may be measured by correlating pre- and post-tax profit rates across
firms (Kornai and Matits, 1987).
d) Credit policy: the real rate of interest on loans from the banking sector
provides a ready indicator of soft lending policies. At rates of interest below the
market clearing level, some form of credit rationing becomes necessary. The
share of credit going to SOEs, compared with their contribution to domestic
value added may allow one to gauge preferential credit access for public firms.
The share of non-performing loans in the portfolio of state-owned banks
indicates whether banks were subject to mandatory policy lending in the past. At
the micro-level a negative cross-section correlation between leverage (credits to
assets) of enterprises and their profit to assets ratios points at distorted credit
allocation.
8
e) Institutional regulations: the existence and enforcement of a bankruptcy law is
an essential prerequisite for an effective hardening of budget constraints.
7 Of course, since in our analysis a standard of reference is missing, the computation of
import penetration ratios merely allows to gauge, whether the overall degree of protection
has increased or decreased in a specific sector.
8 Within an enterprise and over time, profits and credit flows may be negatively correlated,
but at the cross-sectional level, profitability should be an indicator of creditworthiness (see
Pinto et al., 1992 for calculations in the case of Poland).Implementation of such laws may differ, however, as is discussed below. The
rate of bankruptcy among the enterprise population is thus not necessarily the
best indicator. The share of loss-making enterprises in total industry and by
ownership groups may provide a first-hand indication of tolerance of loss-
makers. Further, as the Hungarian case shows, inter-enterprise credits tend to be
drastically reduced with the enforcement of bankruptcy (Kornai, 1993). The ratio
of inter-enterprise debt to total corporate debts or assets may thus represent the
degree of institutional softness due to deficient contract and bankruptcy
enforcement.
f) Finally, wage drift, the discrepancy between productivity growth and wage
increases represents an indirect method of measuring budget softness at the level
of the firm. Data on this may be obtained from an analysis of worker
remuneration and employment levels. In most FCPEs the phenomenon of soft
budgets was linked to the decentralisation of autonomy for management
decisions (Jasinski, 1993). This has in many cases enhanced the power of
worker councils. If this power is not checked by an efficient system of corporate
governance, one would expect workers to claim a larger share of the firm's value
added than would be due to them under profit maximisation. Alternatively, the
lack of a social security system forces SOEs to keep workers on board that are
effectively redundant in the production process. The effect of such
overemployment is technically the same as that of excessive worker
remuneration, although the policy conclusions may differ. Using enterprise-level
data for various ownership groups, we propose to measure the divergence of
wage shares from output elasticities of labour, obtained from Cobb Douglas
production function estimates, as an indicator of allocative inefficiency resulting
from wage drift. Moreover, we measure the degree of adjustment inertia in
SOEs' employment levels compared to that of non-state firms (NSFs) as one
symptom of overemployment.
III. HARDENING BUDGET CONSTRAINTS IN EUROPE'S FCPEs:
THE CASES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY AND
POLAND
This section aims to provide a first testing ground for the hypotheses presented
above and to apply some of the indicators suggested for the measurement of
budget softness to the transition experiences of three European FCPEs withroughly similar starting conditions, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland.
9
Macro-economic performance in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland has
been strikingly similar in the first two years of transition (Table 1). This suggests
that the dramatic decline in output in all three countries was largely the result of
previous structural distortions (Gomulka, 1991; Siebert, 1991) and the sudden
dismantling of public institutions causing a jump in transactions costs
(Schmieding, 1993). However, some differences have started to emerge in the
area of price level stabilisation and factor market adjustment. Extremely low
unemployment and relative price level stability in the Czech Republic contrast
with 15 per cent unemployment and an annual inflation rate in excess of 30 per
cent in Poland (EBRD, 1994). Hungary contrasts to the other two FCPEs in its
huge budget deficit and its protracted financial crisis. Arguably, these
differences may be accounted for to some extent by diverging success in
credibly hardening budget constraints for SOEs early on in the transition process
(Raiser, 1993; 1994c). Let us review the evidence for this contention by turning
to the indicators derived above.
No major policy differences are observable concerning the first three indicators
of budget softness, namely price controls, trade policy and direct fiscal
subsidies. Price controls have ceased to play a role in the subsidisation of SOEs
in all three countries. Over 95 per cent of all goods are now traded at market
prices, with only few consumer services remaining subject to price controls. For
producers the major reduction in implicit subsidies has come from the rapid
increase in energy prices. The change in the FCPEs' trade regime has been just
as dramatic as price liberalisation. There has been a rapid reorientation of
exports and imports to Western trading partners and trade protection is low by
international standards (Falk and Funke, 1993). Taxation policies in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland since the beginning of reforms have aimed to
reduce direct subsidies to,SOEs. Furthermore, the dependence of central
governments on taxes from SOEs has imposed a relatively high tax burden on
most firms in the public sector. In this respect the Czech government seems to
have been toughest, while both in Poland and Hungary tax deferments by SOEs
9 Thereby, this section draws substantially on previous work. See Raiser (1993; 1994c) and
Buch et al. (1994). We should note that policies aimed at hardening budget constraints are
not the only factors affecting macro-economic performance and their effectiveness itself is
the function of exogenous influences, such as the initial credibility and public support of
the government and the ability of the private sector to exert competitive pressures on SOEs
and absorb redundant resources (Kornai, 1993). Our results are thus indicative rather than
conclusive.10
have at times contributed substantially to budget deficits (Raiser, 1993; OECD,
1993). Generally, however, the impact of subsidisation through the fiscal system
is likely to be moderate.
1
0
The attempt to harden budget constraints in the financial markets found its
expression first of all in very tight monetary policies. Here significant policy
differences may be detected. While in the Czech Republic the overall monetary
restriction was accompanied by a dramatic reallocation of credit away from the
public sector (Raiser, 1994c), the banking sectors of Poland and Hungary have
remained paralysed by the legacies of non-performing debts (Table 2) and old
boys networks, that perpetuated distress lending to SOEs in the first phase of
transition. In consequence, particularly Poland has suffered inflation inertia in its
transition so far (Raiser, 1993). Moreover, the lack of credibility of monetary
policies until the beginning of 1991 opened the room for monopolistic price
increases by Poland's industrial conglomerates which delayed the necessary
adjustments and increased the initial price level shock (Kulig and Lipowski,
1994). More recently, with the introduction of new banking regulations in all
three countries, banks have generally become very cautious lenders and the
credibility of monetary policy has improved.
1
1
Turning finally to institutional determinants of budget softness, we may note that
substantial progress has been achieved in all three countries. Differences relate
mainly to the enforcement of bankruptcy laws and to developments in labour
markets (Raiser, 1994c). The Czech Republic limited the profitability crisis in
SOEs by imposing tight wage controls in the first two years of reform (Raiser
and Nunnenkamp, 1993). Thus, wage drift was avoided at least until 1993. The
resulting low unit labour costs have contributed to the rapid creation of new
jobs and wage discipline has contained inflation. While the enforcement of
bankruptcy has been hesitant the shift of employment out of the public sector
has been significant (Raiser, 1994c). By contrast, Hungarian firms have not been
1
0 Fiscal deficits in Hungary are mainly the result of increasing transfer payments to
pensioners and the unemployed, inspite of the fact that payroll taxes in 1993 added as
much as 52 per cent to the wage bill, corresponding to over 17 per cent of GDP (EBRD,
1993, pp. 27-31). The dilemma for Hungary's fiscal policy is that its social security
arrangements have increased adjustment incentives in SOEs, but the costs to the budget are
passed on to investors in the form of higher taxes and high real interest rates.
1
1 Due to earlier consolidation efforts, the rise in interest margins typically following in the
wake of a financial crisis has been contained in the Czech Republic, and banks have
become actively involved in enterprise restructuring and new investment finance. In
Hungary and Poland, in spite of recent consolidation attempts, access to credit remains a
... crucial bottleneck in the recovery process.11





Amount of Bad Loans
1993 (December):
KSc. 110 bn "risky" credits
of which
KSc. 62.5 bn temporarily illiquid
KSc. 47.5 bn sub-standard
and non-performing
1993 (September):
KSc. 194.4 bn "risky" credits
of which
KSc. 28.1 bn temporarily illiquid
KSc. 121.3 bn sub-siandard
a or
non performing
1987: Ft 3 bn
1990: Ft 43 bn
1992: Ft 265 bn
1993: Ft 194.3 bn of which
(March)
sub-average Ft 38.4 bn,
doubtful Ft 67.5 bn,
and bad Ft 88.4 bn
1993: Ft 229 bn of which
(June)
sub-standard Ft 40.6 bn,
doubtful Ft 79 bn,
bad Ft 109.4 bn
1991: Zloty30.5tr
1992: Zloty60.8tr
1993: Zloty 85.1 tr (March)




1992:19.3 (risky credits total)
1993: 22.8 (risky credits total)
1990: 7
1992: 23-38




1991: 16 per cent
1992: 26 per cent
1993: 32 per cent'
Nine state-owned banks:
1990: 10 per cent
1991: > 20 per cent
1992: 30-60 per cent
a The increase in sub-standard and non-performing loans is mainly the result of a change in
classification in mid-1993 (Hrncir, 1993, p. 314).
Source: Buch et al. (1994); Hrncir (1993), NBH (1994).able to contain wage increases in the early phase of transition. Consequently,
when bankruptcy rules were tightened in 1992, a substantial share of industrial
output was affected and unemployment shot up to 12 per cent. However, one
success of the Hungarian approach was the sudden drop in inter-enterprise cred-
its (Table 3). In Poland, the initiative for bankruptcy enforcement laid with the
tax authorities until recently. Their leniency towards SOEs has not only made
wage controls ineffective but also allowed the build-up of a financial black-hole
in the public sector which causes continuing inflationary pressures (Gomulka,
1993). The major institutional achievement in Poland is the rapid growth of the
private sector, which is currently leading the economy out of recession.
Table 3 — Inter-Enterprise Credit in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1990-93
Czechoslovakia
bin. Ksc.


































































































Sources: Czechoslovakia: 1990: Frydman et al. (1993)
1991-92: Czech Ministry of Finance, unpublished data
Hungary: Kornai (1993); NBH, Monthly Report
Poland: BS (var. iss.); GUS (1994).Blbiiofhek
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The foregoing analysis does not aim to provide a comprehensive interpretation
of diverging developments in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. It also
leaves out the most plastic cases of reform failures due to remaining budget
softness for SOEs, such as in many of the CIS Republics and also Romania
(DIW et al., 1994; Rostowski, 1994). What we hope to have shown is that the
measures of budget softness suggested have some explanatory value in
comparing macro-economic performances in FCPEs, particularly in the area of
price level stabilisation. Of course, the determinants and consequences of budget
softness must ultimately be sought at the level of SOE behaviour itself. With the
set of indicators for budget softness in hand we now proceed to a more detailed
examination of the process of hardening budget constraints and the current
degree of budget softness in China. The impact on SOE behaviour is
subsequently tested in Section V.
IV. SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND ENTERPRISE REFORMS
IN CHINA
1. Between Boom and Bust: China's Macro-economic Performance
The two outstanding features of China's macro-economic performance are the
remarkable growth rate of GDP and the large and increasing fluctuations in
economic activity, accompanied by substantial price instability (Table 4). The
first fact distinguishes the Chinese experience from that of all reform attempts in
European CPEs and contrasts sharply with the economic contraction
characterising the initial transition phase in the European FCPEs. The second
fact, however, is reminiscent of the overheating tendencies in socialist
economies analysed in depth by Kornai (1980). Here we argue that China's high
growth rate of GDP is at least partly attributable to fortuitous exogenous factors
(see also Sachs and Woo, 1994; Raiser, 1994b), while its tendency to reproduce
costly inflationary episodes may be related to remaining budget softness for
industrial SOEs, even after substantial hardening in some areas.
The exogenous factors that have made Chinas growth success possible are only
summarised here. The most important ones include the existence of large pool of
natural resources and surplus labour in agriculture, the absence of a macro-
economic crisis at the start of reforms in 1978, a relatively decentralised
structure of industrial production, facilitating the rapid expansion of non-state
activities, and the geographical location in the most dynamic economic region in
the world. The hallmark of China's reforms thus has been the ability to mobilise
enormous additional resources for industrial growth through the early and very
successful reforms in agriculture. Both labour and savings from rural farmers14
Table 4— China's Macro-economic Performance 1978-93, Growth of Gross National Product,
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Sources: IMF (1993); SSB (1993a; 1994).
have fuelled the dynamic development of township and village enterprises
(TVEs). These have both exerted competitive pressures on SOEs and provided
an investable surplus in the form of their workers' savings that has allowed the
state-owned industrial sector to continue its extensive growth path. Finally,
relative socio-political stability and the importance of overseas Chinese trade
links provided further stimulus for a high rate of investment and in consequence
rapid growth of GDP.
Nonetheless both in 1988/89 and more recently since mid-1993 the increasing
strains of this development strategy became apparent (Table 4). The structural
imbalances inherited from the Maoist planning system were not remedied as
long as sufficient surplus resources were available. Clearest evidence for this is
the constant share of industry in GDP of slightly below 50 per cent, and the
continuing deficit in services, characteristic of socialist economies. China's
bottlenecks in infrastructure, particularly energy and transport are causing
growing concern to policy makers. The mounting tensions within China's
industrial sector are illustrated by the decline in the profitability of SOEs in the
wake of accelerated price liberalisation after 1992 (see below).
Through government interventions unprofitable SOEs are enabled to compete
with the dynamic non-state firms (NSFs) for increasingly scarce resources. Only
the reduction of government support can stop the chronic investment hunger of
SOEs subject to soft budget constraints (Komai, 1980; Woo et al., 1994).
Because it takes time to gather the political strength for such a curtailment of
customary support to public enterprises, China's economy has repeatedly gone15
through an inflationary cycle before a drastic stabilisation attempt and a resulting
slump in economic growth set the stage-for a new, round of economic
liberalisation (Naughton, 1991; IMF, 1993). It is hypothesised that with each
new round of reforms the burden of subsidies to unprofitable and unclosable
SOEs shifted to another policy area. The following subsection reviews the six
major areas of budget softness introduced in Section H. We expect to find
budget hardening in some but substantial remaining softness in others, that
would explain the cyclical pattern of China's macro-economic development *
since 1978.
<_,
2. Have Budget Constraints on China's SOEs Been Hardened?
A. Price Controls and Domestic Competition
One method which was used in the past to protect some Chinese industrial SOEs
(particularly in the consumer goods industries) was to control the price of their
inputs at an artificially low level and guarantee deliveries at this price. At the
same time output prices were fixed above international levels and the industries
concerned were protected from competition by tariff and non-tariff barriers and
restrictions on non-state firms' domestic entry. However, during the reform
period entry of domestic firms into most sectors has been almost completely
liberalised and the two tiered price system of controlled and market influenced
prices was introduced in 1984 to allow enterprises to make a gradual transition
from plan to market allocation. As can be seen from Table 5, the government has
increased the pace of liberalisation over the past 3 years, and by 1993 the great
majority of sales were made at market prices. It has been announced that
virtually total price liberalisation will be achieved by 1995. In 1994, only a small
proportion of industrial sector inputs, including raw materials, energy, utilities,
capital goods and transport services were still subject to price controls at levels
below market clearing prices.
Consequently, by now the SOE sector overall probably no longer benefits from
implicit subsidies through price controls. To the contrary, there is strong
evidence that the rising proportion of SOEs making losses is directly linked, to
the accelerated pace of input price liberalisation in recent years (Table 6). At the
same time, profit margins have been reduced by the entry of NSFs into
consumer goods markets. ...
Unfortunately, the sectoral impact of relative price developments within the
manufacturing sector is not entirely clear-cut. As Table 7 reveals, input prices
have generally increased more rapidly than output prices. However, among those
sectors most hurt by a relative cost increase on the input side are producers of16



























































Source: IMF, 1993, p27.
Table 6 — Performance of industrial SOEs in central budget, 1985-1994
1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Proportion of loss making •
industrial SOEs
1 9.6 10.9 16.0 27.6 25.8 23.4 33.0 50.0
Net pre-tax profit of industrial
SOEs as per cent of capital
1- 23.5 20.6 17.2 12.4 11.8 9.7 na na
Subsidies to loss making SOEs*
3- 18.0 44.6 59.9 57.9 50.6 84.4 na
Subsidies as per cent central •
government deficit
2 439 134 158 158 104 na na na




2. World Bank, (1992), p. 95.
3, In billion current Yuan, World Bank, (1992), p. 242.17
industrial inputs, such as energy and industrial capital goods producers, such as
chemicals and machinery. Here, remaining price controls at the output side have
probably served to squeeze profit margins. Indeed, the IMF estimates that 70 per
cent of losses in industrial SOEs are due to remaining price controls (IMF, 1993,
p. 29). The other two sectors that have suffered overproportional input price
increases are the food products and garments septor. Agricultural price
liberalisation has driven up input prices in the former while NSF competition has
contained output price increases in the latter. Among the sectors less hit by a
relative price shift in favour of industrial inputs we should note the textiles,
paper and petrol refining industries. Ail three have highly negative value added
at world prices, as Table 7 demonstrates. Here trade protection continues to have
a decisive protective impact which allows downstream consumer goods
industries in particular to pass on cost increases to consumers (World Bank,
1994; see also IV.2.B. below).
Table 7 — Input and Output Price Deflators and Effective Rates of Protection,














































Source: First Column, Zheng, Yuxin, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
Institute of Quantitative Economies; second column own calculations
based on World Bank (1994, p. 74).18
With respect to domestic competition policy there is considerable anecdotal
evidence that provinces and smaller localities protect their less efficient
enterprises by restricting the entry of products from other provinces and
countries into local markets. This either is done physically, with de facto



























































































































Note: * Small number of firms only.
Source: Survey data, own calcualtions.19
customs barriers, or by controlling the purchasing policies of local government
owned distribution networks (IMF, 1993, p. 19). Evidence was sought on this
issue in the survey of 300 SOE and non-state enterprises analysed more fully in
Section V of this paper. Table 8 reports the results of the survey on this and
related issues. It found that in the four cities surveyed, between 30 per cent of
SOEs and 20 per cent of all enterprises reported restraints on their freedom to
sell their output in other regions. These restraints were highest in Shanghai and
serious in Guangzhou. Interestingly, firms in the special economic zones of
Xiamen and Shenzhen, reported that they were less inhibited by such
restrictions:^ This would imply that these two special economic zones are
increasingly loosing their distinct policy characteristics.
The most important impact on the degree of domestic competition, however, has
come from the growth ofthe NSFs (Jefferson and Rawski, 1994). The high rate
of productivity growth in NSFs and their resulting high profitability has led to
some competition in factor markets but more importantly has restrained SOEs in
their pricing policies (McKinnon, 1991). Overall, thus price liberalisation and
the entry of NSFs have exposed inefficient SOEs to market pressures. The
higher the pace of price liberalisation, the higher the resulting losses of SOEs.
The question is whether subsidies were available from other sources.
B. Trade Policy "
Starting from a position of virtual autarky in the 1960's, China has rapidly
increased its integration into the world economy since its reforms commenced in
1978. The ratio of exports plus imports to GNP increased from 12.8 per cent in
1980 to 38.6 per cent in 1992 corresponding to an import penetration of 24 per
cent.
1
2 (IMF, 1993, p. 62). At a sectoral level, data are only available for very
broad industrial aggregations. In chemicals and allied products, import
penetration rates increased from 15.55 per cent in 1985 to 20.55 per cent in
1992. In machinery and transport equipment the increase was from 20.31 per
cent to 23.97 per cent. The third aggregation for which data is provided contains
both the light and textiles industries and rubber, mineral and iron. In this very
broad category, import penetration has remained constant at 10 per cent since
1985 (SSB, 1993). Indeed, the Hirschman commodity concentration index for
imports has remained quite high throughout the 1980s at approximately 43,
indicating that import penetration has only occured in limited categories of
commodities. Moreover, accounting for pure processing trade, import volumes
1
2 However, these ratios are somewhat exaggerated by the fact that the official exchange rate
which is used to convert traded goods into domestic currency has been significantly over-
valued (by perhaps 30-40 per cent) for most of this period.20
would have to be adjusted downward by up to 40 per cent (von Kirchbach and
Aguado, 1994).
Despite a broad range of trade policy reforms, aimed at lowering the protection
of Chinese producers (see World Bank, 1994 for details), China's average tariff
rate has consistently increased since 1987. China's unweighted and trade
weighted mean tariff rates and the standard deviation of its tariffs in fact exceed
those of seven of the nine highest protection, large developing countries (World
Bank, 1994, pp. 56-57).
1
3 Duty drawbacks on imported intermediate goods have
further increased effective rates of protection and effectively sheltered local
producers of final goods.
There are also significant NTBs associated with the mandatory import plan and
the system of giving national Foreign Trade Companies exclusive rights to
import particular commodities, as well as with separate systems of import
licensing and controls. It has been estimated that non-overlapping NTBs in all
these categories apply to 51 per cent of imports (World Bank, 1994, p. 63).
Although the increasing openness has exposed Chinese producers to some
external competition, tariffs and non-tariff barriers therefore remain high and
provide a significant level of protection for Chinese industry. The recent
reernphasis on trade reforms, particularly after exchange rate unification in
January 1994, is likely to lead to increasing pressures for subsidies from SOEs
so far sheltered from international competition.
C. Direct and Indirect Subsidies
Because price deregulation and the entry of non-state owned competitors has
exposed the inefficiency of many SOEs, massive direct and indirect government
subsidies are being made to this sector to keep loss-makers afloat. As was
shown in Table 6, approximately 50 per cent of SOEs were reported to be
making operating losses in early 1994 (figures released by State Statistical
Bureau, 23/5/94, reported in China News Digest, 25/5/94). In 1985 only 10 per
cent of industrial SOEs were making losses, but this had increased to 23 per cent
by 1992 and 33 per cent by 1993. SOE losses were expected to total Yuan 84.4
billion (just under US$ 10 billion) in 1993, which represents 3.2 per cent of
GNP and exceeds the central government's budget deficit, which was only 2.5
per cent of GDP in 1992 (World Bank, Dec. 1993, p. 7).
In addition to direct subsidies through the budget, loss making SOEs receive
1
3 These countries were India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary,
Kenya and the Philippines. Only India and Pakistan had higher protection rates than China.21
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CAPITAL EMPLOYED BY SOEs
Fixed assets (gross value) of industrial SOEs,
Working capital, of industrial SOEs,
Total capital assets employed,
Outstanding working and fixed capita! loans
estimated government equity, 3-4
COST OF CAPITAL
Average nominal International interest rates
Plus devaluation of Chinese RMB (av. annual rate 1989-92)
Potal nominal cost of foreign borrowing
Average nominal cost of foreign borrowing, 1980-92
Nominal government bond rate
Average nominal government bond rate, 1980-92
CPI increase
inflation in industrial goods prices
FISCAL SUBSIDIES
Pre-tax profit industrial SOEs
Profit retained by enterprise
Estimated profits and taxes remitted
- Nominal rate of return on fixed assets
Subsidies to loss making Industrial SOEs
Net remittances (16-18)
Estimated taxation due (55% of 14)
Estimated equity payments, (19-20)
Est. capital charge due to govt.(@I/N interest rate), (9*5)
Est. capital charge due to govt(@bond rate), (11*5)
Total fiscal subsidy to SOEs <S>i/N interest rate, (20+22-19)
Total fiscal subsidy to SOEs (©bond rate, (20+23-19)
INTEREST RATE SUBSIDIES
Nominal interest rates, working capital
Nominal interest rate, fixed assets
Weighted nominal domestic interest rates
Average nominal domestic Interest rates, 1986-93
Implicit subsidy of SOEs borrowing (c/f 1/N rate), (29-9)
Implicit subsidy of SOEs borrowing (c/f bond rate), (2»-ll)
Approximate loan default rate of SOEs
Estimated interest rate subsidy @ I/N rate (30*4 +9*32*4)
Estimated interest rate subsidy @ bond rate (31*4+11*32*4)
TOTAL SUBSIDIES
Total subsidy @ I/N interest rate, (24+33)




































































































































































































































Note on calculation of net subsidies to SOE sector
l.Subsidies will be approximately equal to expected return on the government's equity holdings in the SOE
sector (rate of return equal to either the government bond rate or China's international borrowing rate). —
2Plus tax which should be paid on profits earned by SOE sector, at the rate of 55 per cent (for period 1980-
92).— 3. Plus the opportunity cost of outstanding loan funds provided by the Chinese State owned banking
system to the industrial SOE sector (the opportunity cost of these funds again equal to either the government
bond rate or to China's international borrowing rate). — 4. Minus net transfers to the government budget from
the industrial SOE sector, including company income taxes, profit remittances including capital charges for
equity capital used and adjustment taxes minus any subsidies paid to loss making enterprises. — 5. Minus
interest payments to banks from the industrial SOE sector.
Sources: SSB (1993a; b; 1994); World Bank (1992) Tables 6.10-6.12, pp. 236-8; Zhao
J • (1994); Lardy (1992) p. 148; World Bank (1994) Table A2.8, p. 299.• . • • 22
several forms of indirect assistance. These include relief from paying capital
charges for the use of government owned assets, postponement or waiver of
taxation, preferred access to subsidised credit through the State owned banking
system and tolerance of non-repayment of bad debts by the banking system.
Table 9 attempts to estimate the approximate total level of fiscal and banking
system subsidies to SOEs. The first part of Table 9 tries to estimate the level of
fiscal subsidies to SOEs due to their failure to pay required taxation and an
adequate return on capital employed. Two alternative target rates of return on the
government's equity in the assets of industrial SOEs
1 are considered; the average
government bond rate and China's cost of international borrowing.
1
4 The
government bond rate could be seen as the financial cost of capital for the
Chinese government (or the financial discount rate), as the great bulk of its
borrowing is from domestic sources. The international cost of capital for China
on the other hand represents the economic opportunity cost of capital for China
(or the social discount rate) since China is now borrowing freely abroad for its
marginal capital requirements (for a discussion of the method of determining the
financial and social discount rates in open economies, see Perkins, 1994c). Table
9 indicates that the implicit financial and economic cost of fiscal subsidies to
industrial SOEs has been rising rapidly during the 1980's. By 1992, the financial
cost of these subsidies could have been as high as Yuan 167 billion ($US 30
billion) having risen from only Yuan 5.4 billion in 1980. By 1992, the economic
cost of these subsidies, using the international cost of borrowing as the
opportunity cost of capital, could have been as high as Yuan 605, billion
($US 110 billion), up from Yuan 103 billion in 1980.
Substantial indirect subsidies are also received by the SOEs via the banking
system. In 1984 the government split the functions of the People's Bank of China
making it into a form of central bank, and establishing several separate banks
with responsibility for different sectors of the economy. However, these banks
were still required to advance policy loans to loss making state enterprises to
prevent them from failing and to the preferred projects of local authorities,
regardless of their financial viability (IMF, 1993, p. 31). In 1988, the banking
system was recentralised in response to the blow out in bank lending in the
decentralised system. Interest competition between the different banks was
discouraged and the demarcation of lending on sectoral grounds was
strengthened (IMF, 1993, p. 21).
1
4 Data on international interest rates is drawn from the International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics, No. 46, 1993. Data on China's domestic interest rates
and bond rates is from the Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 1993.23
Thus the banks have continued to ration credit by government directive, rather
than via higher real interest rates and on the basis of customers commercial
viability. In 1993, 80 per cent of bank credit was advanced to the SOEs,
although they produced only 48 per cent of output in 1992. The collective sector
received only 8 per cent of credit allocated though it produced 38 per cent of
industrial output, and others (foreign and individual owned firms) received 12
per cent of credit and produced 13.3 per cent of output.
In most years since the reforms commenced, real bank lending rates have been
negative (World Bank, 1992, p. 236-37). In 1989 the People's Bank of China
raised nominal borrowing rates for SOEs to 11.3 per cent and they have
remained at this level since then, but this was still less than half the inflation rate
in urban areas in 1993. On the other hand, nominal borrowing, rates for non-
SOEs have been over 20 per cent in 1993-94 (Lin, Cai and Li, 1994, Zhang
Zhouyuan, 1994). It appears that the government is unwilling to charge positive
real interest rates to SOEs because of the negative impact it would have on their
profitability.
1
5 Furthermore, because of the weak implementation of bankruptcy
laws approximately 20 per cent of bank loans to SOEs are estimated to be non-
performing (reported in China Daily, discussions with IMF Representative,
Beijing, October 1994). This represents a further implicit subsidy to industrial
SOEs, as presumably no interest was paid on this proportion of outstanding
loans.
The second part of Table 9 includes approximate estimates of the total indirect
subsidies paid to SOEs via the banking system over the 1980-92 period,
measured in financial and economic terms. Again the government bond rate and
the international interest rate applying to Chinese borrowings were used as a
measure of the financial cost of capital to the Chinese government and the
economic cost of capital to China, respectively. The subsidy implied by the gap
between these rates and the average interest rates charged on loans to industrial
SOEs was calculated. In addition, an approximate estimate of the subsidy to
SOEs from defaults on loan interest payments was included. These calculations
indicate that the financial cost of the interest rate subsidies to industrial SOEs
could have been as high as Yuan 100 billion ($US 18 billion) in 1992, having
risen sharply from Yuan 0.9 billion ($US 0.6 billion) in 1980. The economic
cost of these subsidies, excluding any negative externalities due to the politically
1
5 Recent reforms, announced in November 1993, would provide for a decentralised
commercial banking system, fully accountable for its lending operations. Policy lending
would be branched out to development banks. The legal steps towards such a system have
been taken. However, in the recent inflationary episode of 1993-1994, the government still
mainly relied on direct credit controls (see Raiser, 1994b).24
induced segmentation of capital markets, was estimated to be Yuan 208 billion
($US 38 billion) by 1992, up sharply from Yuan 12.1 billion ($US 8 billion) in
1980. Adding these banking system subsidies to the fiscal subsidies calculated
above, the total financial value of subsidies to industrial SOEs could have been
as high as Yuan 268 billion ($US 49 billion) in 1992, having risen from Yuan 6
billion ($US 4 billion) in 1980. This represented approximately 11 per cent of
GDP in 1992. If the cost of international borrowing is used as the opportunity
cost of capital employed in the industrial SOEs, the economic cost of these
subsidies could have been as high as Yuan 813 billion ($US 148 billion) in
1992, or a staggering 34 per cent of GDP.
1
6 Clearly the banking system and tax
authorities have come to shoulder the major burden of keeping afloat those
SOEs which are not fit to face hardened budget constraints in other areas.
D. Loose Financial Discipline
i) Tax enforcement
Prior to 1983, SOEs were not charged company income tax. All surplus income
after the payment of production costs was transferred to the government. In 1983
the government tried to provide SOE workers and managers incentives by
allowing them to retain some of their profits. At this stage a company income
tax rate of 55 per cent was levied on the profits of all large and medium sized
SOEs. In addition, a variable adjustment tax was imposed to maintain
remittances to the government from individual enterprises at approximately the
1982 level (Takahara, 1992, p. 50). Joint ventures were charged a tax rate of
only 33 per cent tax; As no distinction was made between taxes and capital
charges levied on SOEs, the higher enterprise tax level and adjustment taxes for
SOEs was supposed to include some form of capital charge. However, the 55 per
cent tax rate was only rarely applied. Instead enterprise by enterprise deals were
struck on the level of taxes and profits which would be remitted to the
government. As part of the November 1993 reforms, a uniform tax rate of 33 per
cent was introduced for all enterprises. However, it has not yet evident if this
will be uniformly applied.
In July 1994, the State Taxation Administration Vice Minister, Xiang Huaicheng
indicated that taxation arrears by the SOE sector reached Yuan 16.3 billion in
June and that the sector would no longer be given tax breaks (China News
1
8 The estimates in Table 9 do not attempt to value the net financial impact on SOEs of their
obligations under the remains of the planning systems. These include, inter alia, the
provision of community and welfare services, the surrender of a part of foreign exchange
earnings and the taxation of enterprise deposits by repressed interest rates. The overall
impact would tend to reduce the net social loss associated with SOE subsidiaries.25
Digest, 9/8/94). However, the analysis in Table 9 indicates that implicit fiscal
subsidies due to loose tax and capital charge enforcement were indeed much
higher even in. 1992. In this respect the 1993 tax reforms may face their biggest
test as yet.
ii) Involuntary inter-enterprise credits
Involuntary inter-enterprise credits, mainly between SOEs, termed debt chains or
triangular debt, are again becoming a major problem in China. In 1991 they were
estimated at Yuan 300 billion, corresponding to one sixth of total bank credit, hi
1991-92, a government campaign headed by Zhu Rongji, now the head of the
People's Bank of China, sought to eradicate the problem of chain debts by
injecting Yuan 55.5 billion into the system. Loans were provided to indebted
SOEs, who were required to pay off their most pressing debts. This process
eventually cleared debts of Yuan 183.8 billion. However, Zhu Rongji pointed
out at its completion in December 1992 that this was only a temporary measure
and the basic causes of triangular debt still remained. This prediction has proved
to be correct. By 1994, triangular debt in the north-eastern province of Liaoning
had increased from Yuan 32 billion (US$ 4.6 billion) to Yuan 47 billion. In Inner
Mongolia, debt chains total Yuan 10 billion, and violent incidents have been
reported in the coal and iron and steel industries as workers who are not being
paid have demanded that enterprises owing their firms' cash pay up (South China
Morning Post, 21/3/94).
1
7 Both provinces are particularly heavily industrialised
and face a pressing need for structural adjustment. Inter-enterprise credits have
been used as a cushion against resource reallocation due to relative prices
changes.
E. Institutional Reforms: Bankruptcy, Corporate Governance and
Privatisation
While a bankruptcy law was introduced in 1986 and became effective in 1988, it
has only rarely been enforced in the SOE sector, despite the chronic losses
which many are making. In 1988 a law was enacted making firms into
independent legal entities that were responsible for their own profits and losses
and expected to restructure or accept bankruptcy if making losses. However, up
until 1992 there were practically no bankruptcies reported in the SOE sector,
though it is now common in the non-state sector. Since 1992 there has been an
increased resolve by the government to force unviable SOEs into bankruptcy.
Regional case reports indicate that the process of restructuring is starting to
1
7 Rostowski (1994) argues with reference to Russia and Romania that any government
financed bail-outs carry substantial moral hazard risks and proposes a scheme for
securitising inter-cnterprise debts as part of a market-based solution to the problem.26
accelerate (e.g. IMF, 1993, p. 24-28). Nonetheless, the total number of
bankrupted SOEs since 1988 may not exceed a few thousand out of over 100
thousand large and medium scale SOEs (Singh and Gelb, 1994, p. 14).
After so many years of providing subsidies and protection to the SOEs, the
government is likely to face a credibility problem in attempting to implement its
bankruptcy policy. Experience from Eastern Europe indicates that SOEs are
unlikely to accept that the government will really enforce a hard budget
constraint and tend to act on the assumption that it will continue to bail them out.
Conservative economic forces withiif the government and vested interests in the
SOEs recognise that in the absence of a universal social security system the
government will be unwilling to risk the social unrest which could result from
the widespread bankruptcies of loss making state enterprises (see also Hardy,
1992). The November 1993 Central Committee announcement that China will
move towards implementing such a social security system, funded out of taxes,
may give the government more scope to allow SOEs to go bankrupt and for
individual enterprises to dismiss workers.
1
8
To date, one of the most popular ways of dealing with chronic loss making
enterprises, particularly in the service sector, has been to merge them with
profitable SOEs. This policy is likely to continue in line with the November
1993 reform package (World Bank, 1993, p. 7). However, most mergers have
been initiated by the enterprises' line departments to overcome the problem of
having to declare losses, rather than by the more successful SOEs themselves,
acting on market signals (interview with Cai Xing Huo, Deputy Director,
Economic System Reform Committee, Shanghai, 20/4/94). Consequently, unless
managements of the newly merged enterprises are permitted to sack redundant
workers, reorganise work practices and improve product quality and marketing,
this process may result in little rationalisation of inefficient enterprises. Instead it
will merely enable the losses of inefficient plants to be offset against the profits
of the more efficient SOEs with which they are merged.
In the area of corporate governance, the Chinese government has continuously
opted against the privatisation of SOEs. The 1993 reform package announced
that all large-scale SOEs will eventually be transformed into joint-stock
companies, whose shares would be held by workers, management and other
1
8 The Eastern European examples caution against generous social safety nets with universal
coverage. On account of China's continuing fiscal problems a large increase in revenue
would be required to finance such a scheme without risking on acceleration of inflation.
An employment restructuring fund, along the lines of the National Renewal Fund recently
introduced in India, that is available only to workers from bankrupted SOEs may be more
affordable option for China, given its fiscal constraints.27
SOEs, presumably including institutional investors. However, even in Eastern
Europe privatisation has proved to be the most time consuming reform step,
often encountering the biggest resistance from SOE insiders. This is likely to
repeat itself in China, if a serious attempt at changing corporate governance
structures was made. .
In sum, although economic reforms have subjected Chinese SOEs to increasing
competition budget constraints are still softened due to cheap credit and a
deficient tax system, but also due to the lack of far-reaching reforms in the area
of contract and bankruptcy enforcement. What effects has this operating
environment had on Chinese SOEs?
V. BUDGET SOFTNESS AND ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOUR:
MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE
1. Enterprise Autonomy and Budget Softness
This subsection turns to micro-economic evidence of SOE behaviour using
sample survey data. Before the start of the empirical analysis of the effects of
budget softness it should be noted that industrial reforms in China have also
provided positive incentives for behavioural changes in SOEs, particularly in the
area of productivity linked worker remunerations and SOE manager autonomy
(Groves et al., 1994; Hong and McMillan, 1994). It has been shown that those
measures were quite successful in raising individual SOEs productivity.
However, profit incentives only work in firms that are potentially profitable.
Loss-makers may still exhibit adjustment inertia, partly because administrative
and legal constraints impede a reallocation of resources at the firm level, partly
because it is cheaper to lobby for subsidies (see also Hay et al., 1994).
The nature of the interaction between positive profit incentives and deficient
sanctions in shaping SOE behaviour is particularly debated in the labour market.
While supporters of China's gradual industrial reforms argue that rising worker
incomes have led to a dramatic increase in worker effort and hence productivity
(see Jefferson and Rawski, 1994), others argue that excessive wage payments in
SOEs are the chief reason for their declining profitability (Woo et al,, 1994). The
latter position might also point at the factual inexistehce* of an unemployment
threat in most SOEs, setting incentives for workers' councils, with some
influence over the enterprise management, to maximise worker income in each
period. As Hardy (1992) has pointed out, the absence of an unemployment28
insurance
1
9 causes SOEs to overman or overpay, thus increasing the likelihood
of future losses.
The micro-economic data set analysed in this section may be used to determine
whether SOEs have tended to experience wage drift (overpayment of workers)
or overemployment as lined out in Section II.3.f. above. First, however, we
proceed to an examination of SOE autonomy in our enterprise sample and to a
quantification of two indicators of budget softness that were identified as
important in the Chinese context, namely subsidised bank credit and
discretionary taxation. Only if SOEs enjoyed some degree of autonomy can
differences, in their economic behaviour be attributed to the existence of soft
budget constraints. Similarly, only if the softness of budget constraints for SOEs
is confirmed by the sample data does a comparison of enterprise behaviour make
sense.
The data in the remainder of this section come from a survey of 300 state-
owned, collective, and foreign funded enterprises, surveyed 1993 in four coastal
cities in China, namely Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Xiamen and Shanghai. The
ownership, industrial and provincial distribution of the surveyed enterprises is




As part of the survey, managers were asked to indicate who had primary
responsibility for decision-making over a range of issues related to production
and distribution: the firm's director, management or board of director's; the
enterprise's supervisory authority; or jointly between the enterprise management
and supervisory authority.
As Table 11 reveals, in all four cities surveyed, the SOEs had less autonomy in
decision making than joint ventures (JVs), wholly foreign owned (WFO)
enterprises and township and village enterprises (TVEs), but in Shanghai and
Shenzhen, collective enterprises (COEs) had even less autonomy than SOEs. In
general the degree of autonomy in the surveyed SOEs was quite high, with the
exception of Xiamen where only 10 per cent of SOEs reported that the firm
1
9 Unemployment insurance was introduced in China in 1986 and nominally covers around
70 million employees (IMF, 1993). However dismissals have been rare as the insurance is
typically paid out of the SOEs' welfare fund, which also covers pensions and other
transfers to existing workers and their families. The insurance element for the firm rather
than the worker is thus inexistent.
2
0 This survey was conducted by Perkins in conjunction with Professor Zheng Yuxin, of the
Institute of Quantitative Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, from
May to September, 1993. An overview of the results of the survey regarding the impact of
enterprise and market reforms on oroductivitv prowth is given in Perkins HWdaV29
alone was responsible for decision making. Overall, less than 20 per cent of
SOEs were subject to their supervisory authorities concerning most decisions,
although the divergences between the four coastal cities indicate, that this may
not be typical for the whole of China. For our purposes, Table 11 indicates that
behavioural comparisons may be used to make inferences on the impact of





1 Remarkably, workers committees had no influence over decision making in the SOEs in
our sample. This is unexpected and would ceteris paribus reduce the pressures for wage
drift30

































































































































Source: Survey data, own calculations.31
B) Sources of finance
Table 12 outlines the reported sources of investment finance of the surveyed
firms. Although only a small proportion of SOEs reported that they had access to
Plan allocations of investment finance, no other ownership type received any
such allocations. However, in recent years the SOEs and collective enterprises
appeared to have had better access to bank finance than the TVE and foreign
funded enterprise sectors. Self financing is a much more significant source of
funds for JVE, JV, WFO and even collective enterprises than for SOEs. Finally,
shares and bonds still formed an insignificant source of investment funds in all
the surveyed enterprises in 1990-92.
In order to determine whether the higher reliance of SOEs on bank financing
was due to soft loans provided by state-owned banks to ailing SOEs, a simple
regression was run to establish the relationship between access to bank finance
and enterprise profitability. The proportion of total investment provided by bank
loans (LFI) was regressed on profits as a ratio to capital (profitability). The
results for all firms surveyed and for SOEs and non-state firms (NSFs)
separately are given in Table 13. They indicate that for SOEs there was a
significant and negative relationship between access to bank loans for
investment and profitability. When the regression was run for NSFs, the
relationship between profitability and reliance on bank funds was not significant.
In the light of the massive share of bank funds going to the public sector it may
be concluded that, among the surveyed SOEs, distress lending by state-owned




2 Of course, it may also indicate that profitable SOEs simply did not need bank loans. As
long as real interest rates remained negative, however, and the credit plan was prominent
in the allocation of bank funds, this interpretation is less plausible. Clearly, SOEs with soft
budgets should demand as much credit as they can get. Government fiat largely determined
how much that was.32

































































































































Source: Survey data collected by author
* small sample: one or two firms only.33




















































































Source: Survey data collected by author.
Table 13 — Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Financial System, Relationship






















Source: Survey data collected by author.34
C) Discretionary Taxation
The relationship between post and pre-tax profitability for SOEs and NSFs was
examined to determine if this is another area where soft budget constraints are
evident. An insignificant relationship between post- and pre-tax profitability in
the SOE sector would imply a high level of intervention from SOEs' line
authorities related to adjusting the tax and capital charge payment liabilities of
SOEs to protect them from low profitability or losses. The results of a simple
regression of the log of pre-tax on the log of post-tax profits are given in Table
14. A significant and positive relationship was found between the two variables
for both SOEs and NSFs. However, the coefficient on the log of pre-tax
profitability was lower for SOEs (0.76) than for NSFs (0.85). This indicates
there was a closer relationship between post- and pre-tax profitability for non-
state than for state owned enterprises possibly because there is a greater degree
of intervention by line departments in SOEs, driving a bigger wedge between
post and pre-tax profitability. To some extent this would have reduced the
incentives for profit maximisation in SOEs. However, since the coefficient on
SOEs is both positive and significant, these results indicate that there does not
appear to be a very serious level of distortion introduced by authorities tailoring
tax and capital charge payment liabilities of SOEs to their profitability.

































Source: Survey data collected by author.
Overall, budget constraints for the SOEs in our sample are softer than for NSFs.
However, the differences seem to be smaller than suggested by the macro-
economic evidence, possibly due to the special policy conditions in China's
coastal provinces. To what extent has budget softness affected SOE behaviour in
our sample?35
2. Consequences for Enterprise Behaviour
The starting point for our analysis in this subsector is the neo-classical theory of
the firm. This arguably is not a very appropriate framework for the study of
enterprise behaviour in transition economies as it is not clear what marginal
conditions and profit maximisation should imply in a regime of distorted prices
and limited managerial responsibility. However, NSFs have been subjected to
market prices much earlier than SOEs and their budget constraints may generally
be considered to be substantially harder (Byrd and Lin, 1990). If NSFs behave in
a manner consistent with the neo-classical theory of the firm, a comparison with
the behaviour of SOEs may allow one to identify deviations from profit
maximisation in the latter.
A. Allocative Efficiency in Chinese Industry
To begin with, we assume Cobb Douglas technology in each sector of Chinese
industry. Under the additional assumption of constant returns to scale, profit
maximisation at the level of the firm implies by Euler's theorem that the output
elasticities of factor inputs are equal to the factor shares in total output. If
technological change is neutral, output elasticities will be constant over time and
factor shares should also be constant. Allocative inefficiency may then be
measured as the deviation of factor shares from estimated output elasticities.
More specifically, the hypothesis of wage drift in SOEs implies that labour share
should be higher than the output elasticity of laDour in the state sector.
In an economy where factor mobility is ensured and factor prices are set
exogenously in the market, profit maximisation would also imply that factor
returns should be equalised across firms. Thus Jefferson and Xu (1991) calculate
the coefficient of variation of marginal returns to labour in a cross-section of
firms in 1980 and 1987 to test whether some convergence of factor returns has
taken place.
2
3 Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1992) test for the convergence of
factor returns between SOEs and collective enterprises using aggregate data. In
our sample, we can compute both measures to see whether some kind of inter-
ownership labour market has developed and the extent SOEs are subject to soft
budget constraints.
We start by summarising the data on labour shares in our sample. Table 15 gives
the ratio of total worker compensation in the value of net and gross output (NVO
and GVO) of the firms in our sample subdivided both by industrial sub-sector
2
3 Full convergence will never be fully measurable because of heterogeneity of inputs. A




4 Total worker compensation was measured as the sum of wages
plus bonuses plus total welfare payments. The latter item was available only in
some cases and did not include in kind benefits, most importantly worker
housing. Particularly for SOEs, for which these elements of workers incomes are
very important Table 15 gives a lower bound estimate of labour shares.
Additionallyv the number of observations was very unequal for each year. In
order to ensure a meaningful sectoral and ownership disaggregation, only the
years 1980, 1985, and 1990-92 are presented. Bearing the shortcomings of the
data in mind, we can identify the following trends:

















































































































L/Q, where W is



































































Source: Survey data collected by author.
2
4 Net value of output is a Chinese statistical category corresponding to value added in the
SNA methodology; If is gross output net of material inputs and depreciation.37
First, labour shares have increased in SOEs during the 1980s and have remained
roughly constant since the early 1990s. The increase in labour shares is much
more accentuated in textiles, garments and machine tools. In the iron and steel,
heavy metal products and electrical appliances sectors, labour shares have either
declined or are still at a very low level. Second, labour shares in NSFs have
remained more or less stagnant during the entire reform period. This would
suggest that our initial assumption of Cobb Douglas technology with neutral
technical change was appropriate. Again, at a sectoral level, NSFs display an
increase in labour shares in garments, textiles and also heavy metal products.
Third, labour shares in NSFs overall have exceeded those in SOEs for most of
the reform period. Only in 1991 did the share of labour in NVO in SOEs exceed
that in NSFs. On a sectoral level, SOEs in textiles garments and machine tools
have higher labour shares in SOEs than NSFs. The converse is true for electrical
appliances and heavy metal products, while iron and steel displays no clear
pattern.
Overall, Table 15 yields a contradictory picture of wage and employment
developments in SOEs. The increase in labour shares mirrors Woo et al.'s (1994)
results and could indicate wage drift. However, the diminishing gap between
labour shares in SOEs and NSFs could also indicate convergence of factor
returns. Clear conclusions concerning allocative inefficiency require the
comparison of labour shares with estimated output elasticities.
The estimated constrained Cobb Douglas production functions, allowing for
neutral technological change were specified as follows:
where:VA = net value of output, deflated with sectoral producer
price deflators
a \ = output elasticity of labour
P 1 = output elasticity of capital
X = rate of technical progress
L = end-year total workforce
K = end-year total capital stock
2
5
eit = random error term
and the "i" and "f denote individual and time subscripts respectively.
2) In Qit = In A + <x2 In Lft + 32 In Kit + y2 In Mit + fa + eit
2
5 The capital stock was computed from accumulated real investment data as outlined in
Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1992). The deflator used was computed by Zheng Yuxin
and taken from Perkins et al. (1993).38
where: Q = gross value of output, deflated with sectoral producer
price deflators
a 2> P 2>
L'
K'^ as before ; ; *
Y = output elasticity of material inputs
M = materials used, deflated by sectoral material price
deflator, from Zheng Yuxin, CASS
eit = random error term ; ;.
and the "i" and "t" are individual and time supscripts as before.
Models 1) and 2) were estimated for six industrial sub-sectors, using pooled
cross-sectional data from 1980 to 1992. For the textiles, garments, electrical
appliances and iron and steel industries, pooling over time allowed separate
estimation"by ownership also. Table 16 gives the results of the Ordinary Least
Squares estimates of the output elasticity of labour "alpha". We can see that in
the two factor case (alpha 1), the output elasticity of labour is around 0.60 across
all industries. This implies a profit share of 40 per cent, not inconsistent with
data from other developing countries. Significant differences may be observed in
the heavy metal products sector which has a lower "alphal" of only 0.43. In all
sectors except the garments sector, the output elasticity of labour is higher in
SOEs than in NSFs. Chow tests for parameter constancy, also displayed in Table
16, show that this difference is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
This confirms the importance of computing output elasticities from enterprise
level data if data on labour shares are to be properly interpreted.
For the three factor case, there is considerably more cross-sectoral variation in
the output elasticities of labour. The standard errors are higher (indicated by
lower t-values) which suggests a problem of multicollinearity of the regressors.
Significant differences between state and non-state firms are also evident except
for the electrical appliances sector. The values for alpha2 are significantly higher
for SOEs in the iron and steel sub-sector, while they are lower in garments and
textiles.
Before we proceed to comparing these results with those on labour shares in
Table 15 one further complication should be noted. The OLS regressions were
run assuming constant and similar technologies in all firms in a given sub-
section.; However FVtest.s and aChi-Square test for equal variance, both reported
in Table 16 reject the null-hypothesis of equal variance across individuals for39
Table 16 — Output Elasticities of Labour, Constrained Cobb Douglas Production Function, Two and Three
Factor Inputs, by Ownership and Industrial Subsectors
SECTOR
Textiles

























































































































































































































6 It appears that the error term is picking up the effect of sample
heterogeneity. This could be due either to non-homogenous factor inputs, such
as different qualities of labour or to variations in overall technical efficiency. In
the latter case OLS estimates will not correctly measure technical progress but
output elasticities should be unbiased. By contrast, heterogenous labour inputs
could lead to biased estimates of a and p\ To test for the robustness of the OLS
results, we re-estimated models 1) and 2) allowing for fixed or random
individual effects.
2
7 Whether fixed or random effects are present can be tested
using a Haussman specification test. The results of this test and revised
estimates of the output elasticities of labour (alpha3 and alpha4) in models I)
and 2) are given in Table 17. Rejection of the Haussman test is indicated by an
insignificant P-statistic. In this case random effects estimates are given. Except
for the heavy metal producing sector the output elasticities are not significantly
affected. We conclude that sample heterogeneity is probably not input related
and that OLS estimates may be used.
What do these calculations imply for the behaviour of SOEs in comparison to
NSFs? The strongest result emerging from Tables 15 through 17 is that SOEs by
the early 1980s were paying workers only a fraction of their marginal revenue
product. Much of the wage increase during the 1980s was in this sense an
improvement in allocative efficiency. However, by the early 1990s labour shares
in NVO in SOEs exceeded the output elasticity of labour (alphal or alpha3) in
some sectors. This is most evident for the garments sector, but also for machine
tools using the pooled output elasticity (All) in the latter case. Moreover, had
worker housing and in kind payments to employees, which are much more
prevalent in SOEs, been included, labour shares by the 1990s may well have
exceeded the output elasticity of labour in SOEs in the textiles industry, too. In
the three factor case, SOEs in garments and textiles have labour shares
exceeding the output elasticities of labour. For NSFs, the output elasticities of
labour are more or less equal to the labour shares except for heavy metal
products, where they are much lower. This is also the only sector where the
fixed effects estimates of the output elasticity of labour differ significantly from
2
6 Note, that the F-tests for equal variance over time cannot reject the null hypothesis that
technology is time invariant in most sub-samples. Thus labour shares can be compared to
output elasticities gained from cross-sectional data pooled over time.
2
7 Technically, this implies letting the constant "lnA" in 1) and 2) vary across individuals or
across individuals and time, i.e. "In Ai" for fixed and "lnAit" for random effects.41
Table 17— Output Elasticities of Labour, Constrained Cobb Douglas Production
Function, Two and Three Factor Inputs, Fixed and Random





































a t-statistics in brackets. A






















































star indicates not significant at 5





























per cent level. - " P-
'ixed effects are dominant over
A star indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent
the OLS results. Using the figure in Table 17, the labour share in NSFs does not
exceed the output elasticity even in this sector. Hence we cannot reject the
hypothesis that NSFs in all sectors except for the latter are allocatively efficient.
In conclusion, it seems that wage drift may have become a problem in some
SOEs since the late 1980s but the phenomenon is not accentuated enough to
draw firm conclusions about the macro-economic consequences of inefficient
behaviour. While falling profitability in SOEs is certainly related to rising labour
shares in the GVO and NVO, this development has to some extent remedied
dramatic allocative inefficiencies prevailing at the beginning of the reform
period.
Table 18 summarises the above results in a form that allows direct inferences to
be drawn about the degree of convergence of factor returns in Chinese industry.42
It gives the average marginal revenue product of labour, calculated as alphal x
NVO/workforce for each industry. The right hand side part of Table 18
additionally presents the average nominal wage in each sector. We first note that
there has been little variation in nominal wages across sectors over the whole
reform period. The standard deviation of average worker compensation across
the whole sample is much lower than for any other variable. In the light of
continuing government intervention in relation to average wage guidelines, we
may interpret the increase in labour shares reported above as part of a conscious
government strategy (Hay et al., 1994). Moreover, the tendency of firms to pay
excessive bonuses has been strongly (but often not successfully) opposed by the
government. Table 18 also implies that wages may in fact be the exogenous
variable in the determination of factor intensities at the level of the firm. Thus
the positive difference between labour shares and output elasticities in SOEs in
some sub-sectors may be due more to overemployment than wage drift.






















































































































































Source: Survey data collected by author.43
With respect to the convergence hypothesis the results in Table 18 are ambigous.
There is some indication of convergence in marginal revenue products between
SOEs and NSFs in the garments, machine tools and iron and steel sectors and to
a lesser degree in electrical appliances, where NSFs seem to close the
productivity gap from below. By contrast in textiles and heavy metal products no
convergence is achieved. Moreover, at the level of inter-firm comparisons, the
standard deviation of marginal revenue products (not shown in Table 18) is large
enough to strongly reject the hypothesis of convergence. This points at large
efficiency differences across firms and reveals that these have so far not been
eroded by factor mobility. In the case of SOEs, average wages exceed the
marginal revenue product of labour in the textiles and garments subsectors,
confirming the above indication of allocative inefficiency in these two sectors.
Overall, allocative inefficiencies in SOEs are apparent but not dramatic. This
suggests that behavioural differences over the whole reform period might be
better detected by looking at the dynamics of employment adjustment;
B. Soft Budget Constraints and Adjustment Inertia in the Labour Market
No enterprise will consistently deviate from profit maximisation all the time, if
at least some incentives in that direction are present. However, with soft budget
constraints, an adjustment to an exogenous shock, such as an increase in factor
prices or a fall in demand, may take much longer. Factor market imperfections
affecting all firms may further increase adjustment inertia. This final sub-section
thus attempts to measure the speed of adaption of SOEs to a change in factor
prices and output. Similar studies have been provided for the case of SOEs in
FCPEs by Estrin, Schaffer and Singh (1992b) and are suggested by Earle (1993).
Starting from the assumption of Cobb Douglas technology with constant returns
to scale, the profit maximising condition that the marginal revenue product of
labour should equal the average wage may be written as follows:
VAp a - = w
3)
 L ,,
In Ln = In a - o0 In — + cj In VAit + eit
ypuj
where a 0 and a t are elasticities of factor demand with respect to the
factor price — and real output (VA). For Cobb Douglas technology a0
\PJ
j = 1.
Assuming a partial adjustment process of L in 3), the model can be written as:
4) In If, = e In a - a0 In — + O\ In VAU + (l - e) In Lj(M) + eit I \Pit) )44
where e is the adjustment coefficient to the long-run equilibrium in 3).
Estimation of 4) using time pooled cross-sectional data for the years 1980-1992
suffers from the complication that the lagged endogenous variable is likely to
take over any existing autocorrelation in the error terms. Hence, dynamic models
in the recent literature have been specified as Error Correction Models (ECM),
yielding consistent estimates of both the long term parameter coefficients and a
short term adjustment coefficient.
2
8 The Cobb Douglas technology assumed here
requires that the long run elasticity of labour demand with respect to the real
wage and to the value of output be unity. The ECM specification of 4) can be
written as:
5) -S/Aln — \ +
\PJi
+SqA1nVAi
where: d = adjustment coefficient
o L = long-run real wage elasticity of labour demand
° q = long-run output elasticity of labour demand
5L, Sq = short-run elasticities.
The term in brackets is the long-run equilibrium relationship. Thus a L and c q
are obtained by dividing the estimated coefficients through "d".
Table 19 reports the results of estimating model 5) for four of the six industrial
sub-sectors, where a subdivision by ownership was feasible. Standard errors of
the long-run coefficients were obtained using the Bewley transformation. Table
19 clearly reveals a substantial degree of adjustment inertia in Chinese labour
markets. An adjustment coefficient of 0.1 implies that equilibrium is only
reached after 10 years. Moreover, this extremely long adjustment period is even
longer for SOEs, and the difference to NSFs is statistically significant at the 1
per cent level except for the electrical appliances sector.
Unfortunately, the implied long-run elasticities reported in Table 19 deviate
quite substantially from unity and some coefficients are not statistically
significant. The results of our dynamic model should thus be interpreted
cautiously. As a final test for the robustness of our conclusion concerning a
higher degree of adjustment inertia in SOEs, we estimated the relationship in 3)
using first differences. The results not presented here for reasons of space
2
8 Running an ECM in principle requires testing for the co-integration of the endogenous
variable and the regressors. Our time period was too short to provide a robust test for co-
integration. We report the ECM results and leave it to the reader to judge its quality by the
plausibility of the long-term coefficients.45





























































































confirm the hypothesis of adjustment inertia in SOEs, as reflected in a lower
correlation of the difference in employment levels with changes in real wages
and the value of output.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has drawn a link between the reform of SOEs in economies in
transition and their macro-economic performance. The theoretical basis for this
link is Janos Komai's analysis of soft budget constraints in centrally planned
economies. In FCPEs the soft budget constraints may persist for some time, if
the reform of property rights and accountability in SOEs is delayed. An analysis
of transition processes in Central and Eastern Europe reveals that financial
legacies in capital markets, the lack of corporate control in decentralised SOEs,
and deficient bankruptcy enforcement are the primary causes of remaining
budget softness. A comparison of reform achievements in these areas in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland suggests that the failure to harden budget
constraints on SOEs effectively and early in the transition process carries46
substantial macro-economic costs, particularly in terms of persistant inflationary
pressures.
Macro-economic performance in China has been remarkably good since the start
of its transition process. Nonetheless, inflationary pressures continue to threaten
the sustainability of reforms and macro-economic control seems to be
considerably more difficult now than 15 years ago. Inflationary pressures
currently being experienced in China may represent the beginning of a structural
shift to higher levels of inflation unless remedies can be rapidly introduced into
the SOE sector. The analytical framework chosen in this paper helps to reconcile
a satisfactory growth performance with remaining bottlenecks in the reform
process. While we acknowledge the positive role that increasing autonomy,
competititon with the NSF sector and incentives for profit maximisation have
played in the improvement of SOE performance, a review of a set of indicators
for remaining budget softness reveals that loss-makers still face substantial
protection in China. The financial costs of this protection in the form of direct
arid indirect subsidies are estimated to have reached as much as 10 per cent of
GNP by 1992, and the economic opportunity cost of subsidies are likely to be
considerably higher than this. It is only because of the dramatic growth of
private savings and the dynamism of the non-state sector has China been able to
finance subsidies of this order of magnitude. However, recent inflationary
episodes reveal the limits to this strategy. The current policy challenge is to
further improve the efficiency of SOEs and particularly to reduce the waste of
resources by perpetual loss makers.
With respect to the consequences of Chinese industrial reforms for the behaviour
of SOEs, micro-economic evidence from sample survey data suggests that the
majority of SOEs have improved their allocative efficiency over the course of
the 1980s. Since the 1990s there is some indication that the pressures from
workers have tended to result in excessive increases in average remunerations
compared to the rate of growth of labour productivity. More important for the
future development of SOEs in China is the extremely slow pace of adjustment
in employment levels which suggests that SOEs may be facing an increasing
overemployment problem, as market pressures from domestic and international
competitors increase. It is essential that the Chinese government permit SOEs to
shed redundant workers rapidly if a further deterioration of their profitability is
to be avoided.
Apart from these policy conclusions our micro-economic analysis supports the
validity of micro-economic theory in the analysis of enterprise adjustment in
China. For the case of NSFs, the hypothesis of profit maximisation was strongly
supported and even for SOEs it could not be rejected out of hand, at least in47
recent times. In this respect, we should note that the empirical results were
gained from an analysis of firms exclusively located in the coastal regions of
China. More research including SOEs from inland provinces, less subject to
competitive pressures from imports and NSFs is clearly needed if firm
conclusions about the effects of budget softness on SOE behaviour are to be
drawn. Moreover, a separate analysis of the behaviour of loss-makers along the
lines suggested by Hay et al. (1994) would be helpful in further strengthening
the hypotheses about the behavioural consequences of budget softness at the
firm leveL Finally, our work provides a basis for a more comprehensive analysis
of profitability decline in SOEs which will be the subject of future research. The
distinction of behavioural and exogenous causes of profitability decline would
clearly enable an improvement in the formulation Chinese economic policy in
the future.• "-'^ >"••"• ••-•'" •-•• • 48 •
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